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AGAINST NOMOPOLIES

1

Roderick A. Macdonald, F.R. Scott Professor of Constitutional and
Public Law, McGill University, Canada and David Sandomierski,
McGill University, Canada
ABSTRACT

Legal pluralism stands in counterpoint to conceptions of l~
that sharply distinguish the legal from the non-legal. This
essay considers a neglected feature of classical legal theory prescriptivism - that sustains this binary ambition.
Prescriptivists assert that legal artefacts such as norms are
distinct from the human world upon which they operate. Each
of centralism, monism, positivism and prescriptivism subsu'!1es
diverse associational nomoi · into the nomos of a given
community, often the State, thereby creating a nomopoly. To
the prescriptivist, human beings are subjects under an external
sphere of law. The anti-prescriptivist perspective invites legal
subjects to imagine themselves as legal agents and to discover
the normative potential oftheir own actions. In so doing, these
legal agents are staking a position "against nomopolies ",
however constituted

I. Beyond Legal Subjectivity
Legal Pluralism need not be understood as a .revolutionary or even as an
oppositional project. After all, rejection and resistance are only two of many
strategies for affirmation in the face of dogma. Better to acknowledge
openly the contingency of one's ow~ p~sition ~d, ~ doin~ ~o, to call. upon
those who offer competing symbolizations to justify positions previously
asserted dogmatically. Still, such a reconstructive strategy is risky given the
enthusiasm of legal theorists for exclusionary definitions parading as truth
claims.
The desire to propound a single conceptual test for catechizing. orthodoxy
and extirpating heresies rests, at bottom, on a more general mtellectual
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This text is the fourth in a series of articles exploring different theoretical
dimensions of legal pluralism. It elaborates upon themes developed in Macdonald,
"Here There and Everywhere ... Theorizing Legal Pluralism; Theorizing Jacques
Vand~rlinden'', ·in Kasirer (ed), Melanges Jacques Vanderlinden (2006)
[hereinafter Macdonald, "Here, There and Everywhere"]; Macdonald, "Metaphors
of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism" (1998) 1.5.A~tz.J.lnt'l
& Comp.L. 69 [hereinafter Macdonald "Metaphors of Mult1phc1ty ]; and,
Kleinhans and Macdonald "What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?" (1997) 12
Can.JL. & Soc y 25. We ~e grateful to Jeremy Webber, who shared with us his
essay "Legal Pluralism and Human Agency" (2006) 43 Osgoode Hall L.J I I, and
critically commented on several themes raised in this paper. Blaine Baker,
Nicholas Kasirer Desmond Manderson and Shauna Van Praagh also offered a
close read of the'text that helped us identify unstated assumptions and clarify our
critique of prescriptivism.
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commitment: the appeal to 'law as science'. Wresting law away from
science and more particularly from the protocols · of 20th century
experimentalist science2 · requires re-casting the primary actors in its
dramaturgy, re-framing their roles, and perhaps even re-writing the play. At
once contemporary mainstream theoretical accounts, and the principal
critiques of these mainstream accounts, conceive law as a set of relatively
determinable institutions, practices and rules that are imposed on legal
subjects.3 For many scholars, the law so conceived is understood as the
official law of the State, enacted by a legitimated authorify, interpreted and
applied by designated experts, and ultimately enforced by organized
coercion. For others, this imposed law also embraces normativity that pops
up in unofficial sites of human interaction: the "law" of the playground, of
the barrio, the classroom, the market place, the workplace, the family. 4
Despite important differences among themselves, these various visions of
law share a shortcoming.
Each presumes that people subject to
(etymologically, "thrown" [jacere] "under" [sub-]) the law (conventionally
described as legal subjects) are separate from it - that law is a social artefact
external to the manner of its living by individual persons. The much-praised
'Rule of Law' is, on such a view, simply the domination of some people by
other people - the latter claiming power expressed through what are said to
be scientifically objective, abstract, impartial and politically legitimated
norms.
That such accounts have a strong claim on the contemporary imagination in
European and European-derived legal cultures is no surprise. For several
centuries we have been delegating knowledge and the practice of knowledge
to specialists such as scientists, technicians, doctors, accountants, professors,
high priests and gurus. These experts assert authority as resting on their
special insight into one or another frame of reference through which we
might attend to that which is conceived as external (or in the case of

2

3

4

We have in mind here conceptions of science such as that advanced most notably
by Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: the growth ofscientific knowledge (1969).
The position we develop in this paper, by contrast, has much resonance with the
approach of Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1956). The impact of natural science
models on legal thought is explored in R. Berkowitz, The Gift of Science: Leibniz
and the Modern Legal Tradition (2005) and. H. Sch weber, "The Science of Legal
Science: the Model of the Natural Sciences in I 9•h Century AmeriCan Legal
Education" (1999) 17 Law & Hist. Rev. 421.
To specify, without claiming to offer an exhaustive list, we would include in the
former (mainstream) category those who claim to be legal positivists, legal realists,
and scholastic natural law thinkers, and in the latter (critical) category, those postrealist postures advanced by adherents of law and economics, CLS, diverse
feminist analyses, queer, critical race and post-colonial legal .theorists.
At one point these competing approaches tended to follow established disciplinary
patterns.
For example, most jurists, political scientists, economists and
philosophers imagined law as an artefact of the State, while most anthropologists,
sociologists, and cultural studies scholars attended to law as an interactional
phenomenon. For an exposition and critique of this disciplinary dichotomy see
Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (2d) (2003). Today these competing
symbolizations of law remain, although scholars in all disciplines may be found in
both. A good early conspectus of anthropological approaches to legal pluralism
may be found in Merry, "Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22 L. & Soc.Rev. 869.
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psychiatrists, also internal) to us. How re~suring~ then, .to ~ee the law in a
similar scientific compass - as part of this exterior, objectively knowable
realm. How convenient to delegate to specialists responsibility for
proclaiming both its epistemology and its ontology; and how much easi~r to
live as if human action generally could be governed, and our own actions
actually were governed, by identifiable, determinable and determinate rules.

the process in the language of law. 5 Rather, expressions like custom,
convention, p~actice, common understandings, ways of doing things, and so
on are more hkely to be 'used to characterize these nonnative processes and
sites.
In response to this felt distance between law and norm, typically translated
by popular disengagement from formal processes of governance legitimation
like elections or recourse to courts, legal theorists have recently expended
much energy in developing and proclaiming new approaches to law, The
thrust of their endeavour has been to present arguments to sustain the
legitimacy of official normative institutions, and in particular official
insti~tions of the political State: for mainstream theorists, the judiciary
esp~cially; ru:id for critical theorists, the democratic legislature. While many
cnt1cal theonsts have not sought to reimagine practices and institutions of
political democracy (''trashing" of doctrinal necessity being the preferred
6
ai:ialytical m~de), ma!ns~ea?" theorists have found salvation in proclaiming
diverse theones of adjud1cat1on that offer what they conceive as transparent
fonnu!ae for discerning and interpreting the rules that guide or command
behaviour and for tracing the responsibilities of authoritative decisionmakers charged with so doing. 7

Even those commentators who are sceptical of an uncontroversial normative
determinacy contribute to the objectivist fantasy. Indeterm~acy doe~ .not
automatically translate into agency. In the standard sceptical rendition,
behind indeterminate rules lie power and domination, equally external and
determinable, and equally governing of the legal subject. W?e~er !aw is a
closed normative system, or whether its rules, practices and mstltutions are
permeated by other social, economic and political norms i~, ~or present
purposes, immaterial. In both cases, the human person is meluctably
portrayed as legal subject.
Specialized knowledge marshalled to facilit~te ~ssembly-line p~o~uction is
such a dominant cultural metaphor that v1ewmg human activity - and
possibility - as other than a predictable iteration of subjects under legal rnles
becomes exceedingly difficult. Determinate normativity .extends beyond
first-order, official legal rules. Hence the idea of natural law (whether arising
in divine law or in "human nature") comprising knowable principles of right
conduct by which to judge first-order rnles. While this historical view is
now largely dismissed as a mythological ''brooding omnipresence in the
sky", its contemporary second-order surrogate, human rights, replicates the
same . self-positioning of subjugated human beings -'- only now under
Declarations, Charters, and Bills of Rights and other trappings of law's
empire such as unwritten constitutional principles.

We take a different tack in this essay. We do not proclaim yet another

alter~ative, understanding of the ma~ing and interpretation of legal rules b;

officials, and the modes by which these official activities may · be
8
legitimated. Nor is our concern with enforcement (or compliance) and the
reduction of the evident "gap" between what this newly relegitimated law
oste~sibly. requires and human conduct. The inquiry, rather, is directed to the
rela!1onsh1p between legal rules and those whom these rules cast as legal
subjects, as seen from the perspective of the latter. Consider the questions:

Tue latter-day imperial fantasy of determinate law nonetheless confront~ a
paradox: although the institutions, practices and rules are becommg
increasingly formalized and visible, their impact on human behaviour
remains mysterious and adequate accounts of it elusive. Equal citizenship
and political democracy are meant to legitimate processes of norm
production and application, whatever the site of law. But when people feel
alienated from formal political regimes (be these of the State, the trade
union the university, the corporation, the social club, the NGO) they cannot
belie;e with any great commitment that the putatively "representative" laws
enacted through these purportedly "legitimated" political processes reflect
their agency.
Tue faltering of belief is general and is not limited to regimes characte~zed
by official roles, processes and structures. Today people take as a given,
even in informal institutional settings such as the family, a circie of friends,
their neighbourhood, the shop-floor, or a social outing, that rules wi.11 be
imposed upon them. Much of the law there generated does not f:el like a
reflection of decisions they either make or validate. More than this, to the
extent that people directly participate in processes of norm-generation, and
that decision-making is genuinely collective and consensual (and even more,
to the extent that they are aware of so participating), they tend not to describe
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8

Lon Fuller in!\dvertently caught this insight in his famous essay "Two Principles of
Human Association", reprinted p.81, in Winston (ed.) The Principles of Social
Order (2002), by distinguishing between organization to pursue a common end
and organization based on the legal principle (emphasis added). Of course, Fulle;
did not mean that disagreement and conflict are absent in collective decision~aking. Indeed, collective decision-making typically presupposes at least initial
disagreement, and more often than not, the ultimate imposition of a decision under
some .legitimated ~rocess. But the point is that even for legal theorists with as
catholic a conception of law as Fuller, processes of social ordering that do not
presuppose both rules of duty and entitlement, and third party decision-making, are
not law.
An important exception is, of course, Roberto Unger. For two powerful efforts, see
False Necessity (1997) and, with West, The Future of American Progressivism
(1998).
This is not to claim that such theorists must adopt some form of legal positivism.
For example, both Dworkin - see, A Matter of Principle (1985), and Freedom's
law ( 1996) - an unabashed anti-positivist; and Raz - The Authority oflaw ( 1979),
and Ethics in the Public Domain (1994) - an equally unabashed positivist, are
engaged in the endeavour of explicating law by explicating authoritative
institutional adjudication and its agents.
'
In recusing ourselves from such "re-inventive" political projects we should not be
taken as denying their importance. See, e.g. works arguing for the inescapable
need for a "paradigm shift" such as de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common
Sense (1996), and, in a more general context, Capra, The Turning Point (1983).

I
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How do legal subjects imagine, invent, and interpret Jegal rules? What
bearing does any particular formulation in language chosen by a court or
legislature have on this inventive and interpretive activity? and, How do the
actions and practices of legal subjects instantiate the rules they conceive and
perceive? 9
To understand why people act as they do, what standards and notions of
justice guide their actions; we need set our sights not so much on the rules as
on people themselves. As Robert Cover put it, associational activities of
10
communities "create law as fully as does the judge". But for Cover that
11
He seeks to repa?"iate
creation operates "in the shadow of coercion".
diverse associational nomoi into the nomos of the state - thereby creatmg a
nomopoly - and calls for courts and officials to affirm this nomopoly by
pluralizing their sources of understanding. Cover's emphasis on judicial
officials is perhaps understandable given that he was writing the foreword to
the Harvard Law Review's Supreme Court issue. Still, it is difficult to
discern in his other writings an account of what it would mean to
acknowledge the fluidity, diversity and relative autonomy of this
jurisgenerative activity. 12
This ambiguity raises a more .fundamental point.
We question the
foundational, axiomatic character of what appears to be Cover's background
premise: that law creation is social and episodic. We argue that interactional
norms are not simply a type of proto-law contingent on or secondary to the
legal violence of the State - replicating and reinforcing the patterns of
coercion and domination found there. Nor are they parasitic on formalized
'associational activity' that can be functionally assimilated to the institutional
processes comprising the legal regime of the State. Still less are interactional
norms mere social customs and practices serving some implicit coordinating
role. Finally, we argue that they are not uncontroversial and unambiguous
descriptions of fact - simply observable regularities in behaviour - shorn of
their claim of normativity .13
Put affinnatively, we claim both that interactional norms are legal (not just
proto-legal) norms and, more importantly, that what typically are described
as legal norms themselves are instantiated in interaction. Legal norms, in

whatever site of law, are imagined by human beings, given expression by
human beings, lived by human beings, followed by human beings, modified
by human beings, rejected by human beings - in a word, constituted by
human beings not primarily as passive legal subjects, but above all as active
legal agents. The obligational force of legal rules derives not from the
nonnative status with which they are vested when ultimately wielded by
officials, but from the nonnative status human beings afford them in their
everyday lives.
A quartet of beliefs that inhere in standard accounts of the legal enterprise
must be overcome in order for people to engage fully the dialectic of action
and sufferance embodied in this conception of law. For convenience we
adopt conventional labels for these commitments: monism (the belief in the
unity of legal nonnativity), centralism (the belief that law and state are cotenninus), positivism (the belief that a hard ex ante criterion may be
propounded for distinguishing between that which is, and that which is not,
law), and prescriptivism (the belief that law is a social fact existing outside
and apart from those whose conduct it claims to regulate). 14
Numerous corollaries may be derived from this constellation of assumptions.
For present purposes two, both relating. to formal properties of legal rules,
merit notice. 15 First is the proposition that only explicit nonns - that is,
nonns the particular linguistic expression of which is delegated to an official
institution· like a legislature or a court - are truly nonnative. To require
judicial fonnulation of custom, or the legislative codification of a practice, in
order for these behaviours to have "nonnative force" are among the tactical
fictions relied upon by contemporary mainstream theorists in order to
maintain a homogenous symbolization of the rules-that-bind as officially
imposed. Second is the proposition that formulaic nonns - that is, norms
that can be expressed in a canonical prescription like a legislative enactment
- are the preferred mode for announcing ·1egal rules. The desire to have
courts elab9rate a specific ratio decidendi of a case, or to specify the exact
content of general principles of law that sustain a particular constitutional
regime is driven by a perception that the statutory fonn is the optimal mode
·
for elaborating legal rules. 16

14

Framing the matter this way recalls Paola Freire's idea of the pedagogy of the
oppressed. See Freire, Pedagogy ofthe Oppressed (1970).
10 Cover, "Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv.L.Rev. 4 at 28.
.
11 ibid., at 40. By "shadow of coercion" Cover does not reference the v10lence
attendant upon the associational activities of communities, but rather signals the
omnipresence of the State and its apparatus.
12 Cover's jurisprudence is hard to unpack here. See, for examples of divergent
interpretations, Minow, "Introduction", in Minow et al (eds.), Narrative, Violence
and the Law: The Essays ofRobert Cover (1993), who claims, at p.9, that Cover did
not concede the necessary superiority of state norms; and Ryan, "Meaning and
Altemity'', p.267, ibid., who suggests the contrary. The essays in the Symposium on
Cover's work in Issues in Legal Scholarship also suggest interpretive ambiguity.
See especially Brooks, "Let a Thousand Nomoi Bloom: Four Problems with Robert
Cover's 'Nomos and Narrative"', www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/art5, for a close but
unsympathetic reading of Cover's conception of law. Ironically, this (we believe
incorrect) interpretation of Cover aligns with the argument we advance here.
JJ In this we follow Webber, supra n. I, at 2-3.
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15

16

These beliefs are discussed in detail in Macdonald, "Here, There and
Everywhere", supra n. I.
The following paragraph encapsulates a normative taxonomy first elaborated in
Macdonald, "Vers la reconnaissance d'une normativite implicite et inferenetielle"
( 1986) XVIII Sociologie et Societes 46.
It follows that, in this schema, the logical structure of normativity can be plotted
along two axes: the implicit/explicit, and the inferential/formulaic. Legislation is
the best example of the explicit and formulaic norm and may be characterized as
"manifest" normativity. Unwritten general principles of law are both implicit and
inferential and for this re!!Son may be conceived as "latent". Other combinations
include "allusive" norms, which are explicit and inferential, such as those
expressed in judicial decisions, and "routine" norms, such as customary practice or
business codes, which are implicit but formulaic. For a further elaboration of this
model of legal artefacts that embraces not only rules, but processes, methodologies
and institutions, see Macdonald, "Les vieilles gardes: hypotheses sur I' emergence
des norms, l'intemormativite et le desordre atravers une typologie des institutions
normatives', p.233, in Beiley (ed.), Le droit soluble: contributions quebecoises a
l 'etur./,e de l 'internormativite ( 1996) [hereinafter Macdonald, "Les vielles gardes"].

. !I··
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We reject both the assumptions and the corollaries. While we locate
ourselves as legal pluralists, 17 we nonetheless take our distance from
empirical, social scientific conceptions of legal pluralism. 18 As a ~er
departure, we do not adopt a prescriptivist stance towards legal normativ1ty.
We deploy the word law here to mean ''the endeavour of symbolizing human
interaction as being governed by rules". 19

tool does not compel the universality of its recognition by specific human
beings. 21
Our root claim is that it is possible to interrogate human practice and
behaviour for its normative import without having to assume that this
normative import must be judged against some kind of law that pre-exists
and is external to its presumed legal subject. Indeed, we see this inquiry as
central to achieving a better understanding of our responsibilities to
ourselves and as members of normative communities. 22

Nor are we staking out new territory for jurists to conquer or colonize. A
claim that "law is (potentially) everywhere" does not carry the implication
that the writ of the jurist should be dominant in every social location.
Because law does not pre-exist human recognition of it, where law is, and
more particularly, whether law is everywhere is a question that only specific
human beings can answer for themselves. 20 In this sense, law is everywhere
in the same sense that "economics" is everywhere, or "politics" is
everywhere. The universality of any theoretical hypothesis as an analytic

17

18

19

20

Of course, the expression covers a multitude of perspectives and manifold P?litical
projects. Compare Merry, supra n.4, at 890: "Legal pluralism provides a
framework for understanding the dynamics of the imposition of law and of
resistance to law ... "; with Chiba, "Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the
Contemporary World" (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 228 at 242: "[L]egal pluralism is the
coexisting structure of different legal systems under the identity postulate of legal
culture in which three combinations of official and unofficial law, indigenous and
transplanted law, and legal rules and legal postulates are conglomerated into a
whole by the choice of a socio-legal entity"; and Teubner, "The Two Faces of
Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism" (1992) l3 Cardozo L.Rev. 1443 at 1443:
"Legal pluralism rediscovers the subversive power of suppressed discourses".
.
In this respect our position approximates that advanced, most recently, by
Melissaris, "The More the Menier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism" (2004) l3
Soc. & L.S. 57. For alternative critiques of social scientific legal pluralism see
Tamanaha, "The Folly of the Social-Scientific Version of Legal Pluralism" (1993)
20 J.L. & Soc 'y 192; "A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism" (2000) 27
J. L. and Soc 'y 296; and A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (2001) at
171 et seq.
The formulation is taken from Macdonald, "Here, There and Everywhere", supra
n. l. Consider the implications of each of the following terms of the hypothesis.
To say "endeavour" implies that law is an idea that can be understood only if it
requires more of us than simple cognition - it demands that we commit ours~l~es
to its achievement. "Symbolizing" implies that law results from the mental activity
of perception and reflection. "Governed" implies the idea of orienting oneself and
one's intentions and behaviours through a point of reference beyond the particular
act or the intention - even in those cases where the reference point is largely of our
own making. And "rules" implies norms or generalized hypotheses of action that
are conceived, at least hypothetically, to pre-exist the human behaviour that is
being symbolized.
This assertion does not mean that power, domination and violence practiced by
officials who claim the authority of law will disappear if tl1ose upon whom such
domination is visited refuse to acknowledge the "legality" of that claim to
authority. The point is rather that whether any such actions can be conceived as
law requires two conditions to be satisfied: one or more persons must make a
claim against another that an action is justified by law, and the other must
acknowledge the legitimacy of the claim being made, both in general and in the

particular instance.
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II. From Artefact to Agency
Those who essay a theoretical account of law today usually begin with a
rather large inventory of the artefacts they conceive as necessary components
of the legal enterprise: rules, concepts, taxonomies, institutions, officials,
proced~es, methodologies, techniques, assumptions, purposes, goals, values,
1deolog1es, and so on. 23 This artefactual inquiry inevitably leads to an
investigation of the institutional sites for making and applying legal rules and
to the rules there made or applied. The dynamic endeavour of symbolizing
human interaction as governed by rules is reduced to the end-product - the
rules themselves.
Once thi~ occurs, the human dimension in procedure, method and technique
(what might be called the purposive dimension of law) is left aside and the
analogies become scientific, mechanistic and structural. More than this,
because the focus is on institutional actors, and not on those to whom the
rules may be directed, the pedigree of norms rather than the goals being
pursued (for example, justice, equality, liberty, social solidarity - or
genocide, ethnic cleansing, class differentiation) becomes the criterion of
legality. Finally, the investigation of pedigree concentrates attention on lawmake~s, a preoccupation that not only tilts reflection to law that has a literary
deposit, but also promotes official interpretation of texts (typically by judges)
as the central legal activity.
21

22

23

Conversely, to say that law does not pre-exist human recognition of it does not
mean that anything human beings choose to consider as law is law. In this we do
not follow the lead of Tamanaha, supra n.18. There is a particular content to law
as a human endeavour that speaks to assumptions, modalities, procedures and
aspirations. Hence the claim that law should be hypothesized as "the endeavour of
symbolizing human interaction as being governed by rules". We develop this point
below. For a further statement see Macdonald, "Triangulating Social Law
Reform", p.121, in Gendreau (ed.), Mapping Society through Law (2002).
The inqairy begins with particular human beings: particular human beings must
first grapple with. their relationship to norms, and interrogate their responses to any
~ive? social s_ettin~ for its ??rmative content. Of course, this "individual" response
mev1tably arises m a m1heu already comprised of other· human beings and
consequently immediately begins to play a role in imagining that milieu or
comm~nity. As human beings re-imagine their relationship to rules (or imagine
rules m the first place), they participate in reconstituting (or constituting) the
collective normative field.
:
·
We draw this inventory from the domain of comparative law theory. For a brief
encapsulation see Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (1985), p.7. Not
surprisingly, a similar inventory is, at least provisionally, advanced by those who
take a functional approach to legal pluralism. See the discussion in Merry, supra
n.4.

618

Let us invert the commonplace emphasis on descriptive categories of legal
rules, preferring an inquiry into everyday human reactions to rules to ex a~te
conditions of their pedigree, structure or function. 24 Rather than developmg
a taxonomy to examme one or another property of norms, let us use different
25
instances of norms in society to raise issues of"effectivity".
We can start with n01mative technical or measurement standards such as the
26
one kilogram, one metre, one litre, one degree Celsius, and one minute. As
norms, these are all meaningless unless we accept them, reject them, or in
some other way use them to help us think about measuring and more directly
perform measurements. 27 However important the field to be measured and
the object of the standard, the key question is the relevance we accord this
standard in structuring our lives, and not the actual source or origin of the
norm. 28
It is no different with behavioural norms. The rules of chess, Roberts' Rules
of Order, Emily Post's Etiquette, the Code of Canon Law, and an edict with
Parliamentary approval are equally irrelevant if they do nothing to

24

25

26

27

28
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Because of their visual appeal (especially when arranged in second-order
analytical tables rather than as simple lists) descriptive categories can hijack
inquiry and understanding. Consider the following familiar techniques for
"sorting" norms: pedigree (as legislation, judicial precedents, customs and
usages); structure (as institutionally generated or informal, as canonical or
iterative); function (facilitative, prohibitive, duty-imposing, power-conferring); or
even their purposes (as retributive, commutative, distributive, allocative). What
do any of these categories tell us about the role that the norms they classify play in
everyday human life?
The expression is taken from Lascoumes and Serverin, "Theories et pratiques de
I'effectivite du Droit" (1986) 2 Dr & Soc 'y 101. See also Garcia Villegas,
"Efficacite symbolique et pouvoir social du droit" (1995) 34 Rev.Int.E.Jur. 155;
and Rocher, "L'effectivite du droit", p.133, in Lajoie, et al. (eds.), Theories et
emergence du droit : pluralisme, surditermination et effectivite ( 1995).
The examples could be multiplied several times over; we measure energy
(Newton's, Joules, Watts, calories), acidity (pH factors), light (the visible
spectrum), pressure (kilopascals), noise (decibels), properties of electricity (ohms,
volts, amperes), angles, and so on.
For example, we can puzzle about the contrast .between formal measurement
system and more "experiential" ways of measuring. What do we gain, and lose,
by substituting a base-ten SI measurement system for inches, feet and yards, for
ounces, pounds and tons, and for pints, quarts, gallons, barrels, gills, pecks and
bushels? See for discussion, Macdonald, "Measure for Measure", p.64, in Lessons
ofEveryday Law (2002) [hereinafter Macdonald, "Everyday Law"].
The point becomes obvious when we consider the difference between these types
of technical standards and "scientific laws". Kepler's law, Newton's law, the law
of conservation of mass and energy are not normative in that for most people they
are not instrumental to some other purpose. A similar point can be made about
various mathematical formulae. While counting on a base-two, base-ten or base·
twelve system is like choosing between SI and Imperial measurement systems,
certain mathematical formulae do not admit of human agency. There is a
significant difference between a legislature adopting a statute proclaiming that
consumer prices and currency values shall be expressed in a base-twelve system,
and that same legislature proclaiming that the value of pi shall be 3.l or the square
root of 2 shall be 1.5.
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encourage, repress, organize or define some human activity. 29 . Their use,
meaning and significance depend on people's lived interaction with them,
and not their pedigree - their artefactual character in and of itsel£3°
In legal analysis, a preoccupation with form, origins and institutional
expression distracts attention from inquiry into the conditions that have
provoked the normative questions that the instantiated rule purports to
address. Because normativity starts with actions and not the representations
of these actions,31 the meaning of a legal obligation ought to be the necessary
starting point. 32 Curiously, however, much contemporary legal theory
reinvents the inquiry into normative foundations as a cataloguing of sources
of law. Cause is pre-empted by pedigree. The basic question becomes,
'What inventory of normative types is identified by a rule of recognition
enunciated by a primary law-applying organ as valid within a particular
normative system?' 33 In the manner of the Cartesian God, human beings,
after setting the legal machinery in operation (and at least in democratic
political theory occasionally formally revalidating it through an electoral
process), have no further role to play - other than to be passive legal
subjects.

'I

The notion of official sources is revealed as a thin conception of law's
nonnative foundations once we attend to the ways in which people
constantly reconstitute the standards by which they live as they understand,
interpret, and respond to these standards in their daily activities. Because the
everyday law of everyday life is part of this ongoing interaction - a reflection

29

30

31

32

33

The expressions encourage, repress, organize or define are not meant to suggest
that, as norms, their effectivity is co-terminus with their .efficacy. A conscious
departure from Robert's Rules of Order, or an action purportedly (but mistakenly)
justified by reference to Roberts's Rules of Order are both instances of human
·
beings engaging with these behavioural norms.
The point is beautifully developed in a paper by Shauna van Praagh, exploring the
jurisprudence of "Harry Potter". See van Praagh, "Adolescence, autonomy and
Harry Potter: the child as decision-maker" (2005) I Int. J. ofLaw in Context 335.
To say that actions are at the foundation of normativity does not mean that these
actions must be self-consciously conceived as normative. Often we only become
aware of the implicit law that structures our behaviour when called upon to
explain how or why we have acted as we have.
The point is now generally recognized in legal theory as a result of H.L.A. Hart's

magnificent introductory text that developed the difference betWeen internal and
external points of view. See Hart, The Concept ofLaw (1961; 2"d ed., 1996).
The sleight of hand is this. The human activity that grounds legal obligation and
in respect of which inquiry into the internal point of view is necessary, is no longer
that of legal subjects; it is rather the activity of judges, whose pronouncements
about what that internal point of view leads them to conclude are inventoried as
sources of law. Desmond Manderson neatly captures the point with his
observation of the difference between dog lovers (who care for, nourish, and play
with mutts as well as pure-breeds, and who think about dogs as being friendly or
vicious, rambunctious or reserved, healthy or sickly, and so on) and dogformalists
(who care only for a pedigree certificate and the conventional or predictable
implications of that certification). Of course, a dog formalist may also selfidentify as a dog lover; but his or her claim can never escape the question: to what
extent does the "love" depend on a fetishism of pedigree?

I
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of choices made and remade through time34 - sources of law can never be ·
more than hypothetical expressions of the ways by which ti;iat foundatio.nal
interaction - these normative conditions - have been symbolized by officials
who claim the authority to do so, 35

Meaningful legal inquiry calls for rendering latent norms; concealed by an
over"reliance on the manifest, visible. 38
Take, as an illustration, the case of a group of adolescents organizing their
activ~ties within a Scout troop. Numerous manifest, clearly seen norms
putatively operate on the group. Explicit and formulaic norms (e.g. state
laws and by-Jaws, Troop by-laws, Scout law), diverse implicit and formulaic
norms (uncodified but well-known standard operating procedures), and
explici~ and inf~rential norms (leaders' advice), all form part of a pre-existing
normative matrix.

Once people (and, especially, once jurists) comet? accept the. s~bsti~ti~n of
sources for foundations as a way of expressmg normatlv1ty w1thm a
particular legal system, they symbolize themselves as subj~cts under an
external rule. This shift carries an absolution: as legal subjects they are
absolved of their first-order responsibility as law-creating agents. What then
counts as law within any normative community is for others - most
commonly, officials - to decide. What information and what inquiries are
necessary for them to act with fidelity to law can be reduced to a procedural
or methodological formula. What possibilities there may be for people to
remake the normativity of the communities in which they live are
constrained in advance to a single option: obey (comply, heed) or disobey
(reject, ignore). 36
All explicit instantiations of rules have ~ root that is implicit .and .~fe~ential
and that can be found in human interact10n. These roots are 1mphc1t m that
they are primarily lived, not spoken, and inferential in the sense of being
more a kaleidoscope of concurrent, conflicting, contingent hypotheses than
singular, elegant propositions. Manifest norms such as legislatio~ may enjoy
a better reputation among citizens and among mainstream junsts as real
law,37 but such pedigree characterizations are born of prejudice not truth.

34

35

36

37

Of co'urse, not all action is a conscious choice by individual human beings. Much
of the time, the "choices" that lead to (or-are reflected through) our behaviour are
not made by us, as individuals, tabula rasa. These "choices" are rather the
product of some prior explicit or implicit collective choice that we adopt (whether
consciously or unconsciously). Stil~ the point is that we, in fact, do have a choice
and that when confronted with that possibility, will act in consequence. Moreover,
to claim that choice is possible is not to claim that, even when recognized, it can
be acted upon. Many who oversell individual agency err in abstracting from the
actual life situations (disempowerment, fear, poverty) in which people find
themselves so as to presume as fact what is often just possibility. We consider this
point further in Part II of this essay. See infra, text at n-44-48.
In other words, when courts and other "primary law applying agencies" act so as
to give expression to a "rule of recognition" they are engaged in a ~oundational
interactive practice. The mistake of much contemporary legal theory 1s to assume
that the interactive practices of courts foreclose continuing interactive practices of
those purportedly governed by the law so identified. Simply put, we would claim
that all "legal subjects" are "primary law-applying agencies" giving expression on
a daily basis to their own "rule ofrecognition".
We leave aside institutional possibilities such as running for political office,
lobbying legislatures, engaging in strategic litigation over the meaning of statutory
texts, etc., each of which also offers opportunities for remaking normativity, but
each of which conceives the norm as external to the legalsubject.
To recall, manifest norms are those that have the characteristics of being at once
explicit and formulaic. See supra, text at n.15-16. Two reasons for the "better"
reputation of manifest norms come to mind. First, we may be condition~? ~o
prefer linear, discrete representations of phenomena to complex, probab1hst1c
uncertainties. Second, we may be trained to attend to the visible, to the written, to
the institutional, rather than to look beneath surface labels.

621

But no matter how well-known or how well-internalized these manifest
norm~, anot~er set of practices and understandings, developed through
expenmentat1on, error and unself-conscious activity comes to attract the
lo~alty an~ commitment of members of the troop. As they acquire an aura of
bemg obhgatory points of reference for interaction among Scouts, they
become norms - legal rules for that group. At this point, these rules then
provide a first approximation of how the group defines itself, differentiates
itself from other groups, frames its aspirations and conceives its
achievements.
The interaction of these evolving normative understandings with the
apparently pre-existing normative matrix creates a new nomos. Each Scout
noi:n~Ily give~ its troop's by-l~ws little thought until the yearly by-law
review asks him or her to consider amending the formal rules in light of
re~ent. experience. The standard operating procedures are only helpful as
g~1delmes so far as they ~re appropriated by the Scouts - adapted to new
crrcumstances, tested agamst new ideas - and not merely "followed".
Likewise, advice from leaders is meaningful when members have an
experiential reference point and can position the advice as facilitating their
own initiatives.
The diale~~ic ~etween past and current practices, the writing of the past and
t~e re-wntmg m the present, together constitute each Scout's perceptions of
his or her relationship (and responsibility) to the group and its members. For
all ~ee types of visible representations of rules, the ones that speak to
e:cp.enence (whether as confirmation or disconfirmation), succeed most at
g1vmg meaning. These rules present themselves as real hypotheses of action;
they enable members to perform the triage between norms that teach
something about how to live and those that simply exist because at some
point in the past they may have done so. The triage begins the
jurisgenerative process of making and remaking norms, a process that allows·
the Scouts to discover possibilities within themselves and to renew
commitments to each other and to the group.

38

Our latent norms are, ex hypothesi, invisible. Implicit in the present inquiry is the
point that in holding open the possibility of latent norms, one thereby creates the
conditions under which they can be rendered visible. Visibility is a precondition
for. val~ing; once a s~ift in perspective is achieved, the current pedigree
ass1gnat10ns may be discarded. For a further elaboration of this point see
Brighenti, "Visibility: a category of the social sciences" (forthcoming 2006
Current Sociology),
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Such rules speak to the Scouts as agents. They invite participation,
interaction. transfonnation. Their nonnative reference point (the content of
the rule the rationale behind it, its effectivity) lies far from the putative laws
that car: be pigeon-holed as source-legitimated representations. Rather, it is
located in the agents whose specific interactions constitute the terrain in
which these laws are rooted.
Theoretical projects that examine human behaviour and recast the
interactions in the language of sources as a means to identify or understand
the nonnativity at play actually move in the opposite direction of this
inquiry. Agency is not discovered by identifying the legal in the lived. It is
rendered visible via attentiveness to the lived. To focus on agency by
preference to artefact is to insert a pause in between observation and
analysis, to avoid automatically ascribing nonnative power to the intellectual
abstractions of visible (manifest) law3 9 and to inhabit the concreteness of
40
invisible (latent) nonnativity.
When we move engagement with law from official pedigree (sources) to
interactional foundations (conditions), from manifest to latent, from system
(and systems analysis) to field (and field theory), and from artefact to agency
we are rejecting the prescriptivist impulse that characterizes most
contemporary legal theory. Because human activity is characterized by
inconsistency, flux and contradictions, nonnativity is best seen as a
patchwork of guidelines that are more often in tension with one another than
they are in harmony. 41 Enter anti-prescriptivism. The anti-prescriptivist
claim in its most robust fonn is non-positivist in that it rejects the
nominalization of ''nonn" or "law" necessary to the criteria-seeking
enterprise of legal positivism. The discovery of latent nonns does not lead to
the identification of discrete phenomena which can be used to subdivide the
world. Rather, their identification fonns the basis for further inquiry and
42
exploration into our own situation and, ultimately, the human condition.

39

40
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The image of the pause is borrowed from Alfred Korzybski's groundbreaking
"general semantics movement", which he memorializes in Science and Sanity
(1941). Parallels can also be drawn to Sontag's essay "Against Interpretation'',
where she argues against a knee-jerk attempt to intellectualize art.
Once these implicit and inferential norms are made visible, the challenge is to
notice a double movement: first, how the form of law structures inquiry but does
not exist apart from or unaffected by the inquiry being undertaken; and second,
how the invisible is not thereby eliminated, but reinserts itself through everyday
(so-called unofficial) practices of interpretation, resistance, and reconstruction.
For elaboration in respect of enacted rules, see Macdonald, "The Fridge-Door
Statute" (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 13 [hereinafter Macdonald, "Fridge-Door Statute"];
and for an application to the systemic claims of manifest legal orders, see
Macdonald, "Kaleidoscopic Federalism'', p 26i, in Gaudreault-DesBiens and
Gelinas (eds.), The States and Moods of Federalism: Governance, Identity and
Methodology (2005).
So long, of course, as we do not expect pat answers. Attentiveness to interaction
requires embracing a chaos about the human condition with reverence for the tacit,
unknowable knowledge that permits our humanity, our action. As Gadamer wrote
in Truth and Method (1975), we can never fully illuminate ourselves. The desire
to unearth some monolithic truth is antithetical to the antiprescriptivist claim.
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III. The Emancipatory Power of Anti-prescriptivism
The prescriptivist claim is·grounded in a belief that the central artefact oflaw
is the legal rule authorized under some systemic "rule of recognition".
Although such a systemic rule may pennit a variety of nonnative fonns to
emanate from a variety of institutional sites, legal nonnativity is best
understood by focusing on the properties of explicit rules directed to people
(by contrast with those explicit rules directed to officials): their making, their
application, their interpretation. 43 While diverse post-realist scholars devote
much attention to the effects of legal rules on officials who interpret and
apply them and on everyday legal subjects to whom these rules - either. in
their ex ante linguistic fonn or as interpreted by officials - are applied, the
assumption is that the "rule-official complex" is all that the theory must
address. Of course, much post-colonial, critical race, feminist and queer
legal theory directly addresses impacts, but typically does so by presuming
the legal subject as either passive or as re-active to an imposed external
nonnativity. The pre-action of the ostensible targets of these rules does not
fonn part of the reconstructive theoretical exercise. More than this, in the
imaginary of mainstream theory, the prescriptivist claim implies both a
pessimistic view of human nature, and a detenninistic view of human
capacities.
In the prescriptivist perspective, life is closely hedged by multiple a priori
restrictions on human interaction: human beings are legal subjects, and have
but a single choice open to them -to follow (obey) or to reject (disobey). By
contrast, the anti-prescriptivist claim that human beings are normative agents
and not simply legal subjects presumes that life is characterized by the
possibility of choice: not just choice about the restrictions they will accept
ex post facto on the range of their interactions with others, but also choice
about the range of responses to purported rules that are open to them. 44
In its framing of the re-active options of legal subjects as binary, the
pessimism of those who adopt the prescriptivist perspective reveals itself.

43

44

Interestingly, however, many prescriptivists are preoccupied with institutional
rules directed to officials: rules conferring powers on functionaries such as the
police, or administrative agencies; rules conferring jurisdiction on courts; rules
relating to the procedures of different governmental organs - the executive,
Parliament, the judiciary; and so on. Nonetheless, they organize inquiry as if the
issue could best be characterized as involving the "role" of such offices. As much
as inquiry into legal rules directed to people (contracts, criminal· law, tax law,
regulatory law) is rarely undertaken by posing the question "what is the role of the
citizen?", for a prescriptivist, inquiry into legal rules directed to officials is rarely
undertaken (apart rrom the field of judicial review of administrative action) by
posing the question "what does this rule require?"
We have already acknowledged some of the difficulties with the word "choice".
See supra n.34. Here we pose a further concern: to what extent do social
location, socio-economic circumstance, socialization, and coercion impinge on or
prevent choice, for example? This question is addressed in the final paragraphs of
this section. For current purposes, the point is simply this: once one
acknowledges that human life is not totally determined, the potential of agency
arises. Thereafter, inquiry may be focused on questions such as "how much
agency?", "under what conditions?", "with what degree of self-awareness?" and
"to whose benefit?"
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Human beings cannot be truste~ to act wisely or justly towards others: law
and legal rules are needed to regulate directly human conduct and officials
4
are needed to ensure respect for the rules laid down. s In the antiprescriptivist perspective, by contrast, law and legal rules are the symbols by
which human beings make preliminary and provisional allocations of the
range of choice appropriate to maximizing human freedom - both selecting
the various nonnative communities within which they seek to participate, but
also in selecting responses to the nonnative commitments that such
participation implies. 46
The way human beings establish, apprehend, interpret and interact with rules
around them - whether apparently imposed or apparently inferred - depends
on their attitude toward the genealogy of these rules. 47 If one understands a
prescription to be the primary and definitive manifestation of the law, actions
will be symbolized in a binary opposition - as either "legal" (or in broad
confonnity with the rule) or "illegal" (or not in confonnity with the rule).
Such a position deprives people of any personally meaningful choice; their
response to law is either subservient or antagonistic. If they "break" the law,
they know (more or less) what sort of sanction or violence will attend them,
but if they obey, they learn nothing about themselves, their relationships or
their priorities. 48
Rather than viewing re-active nonnative choices (even when narrowly
confined to the options "obey or disobey") as contiguous with the pre-active

4
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s Not surprisingly, the prescriptivist. claim coheres closely with the Hobbesian
justification for the "sovereign". The difference between tyranny and the Rule of
Law is simply that the latter purports to find justification for imposed order in
some process of democratic legitimation of legislative action and judicial
impartiality and independence. Even contemporary "critical" scholars are
fundamentally Hobbesian in perspective - the difference being their faith in some
form of direct participatory democracy as a check on the corruption of the state by
dominant class or economic interests. See, for an unrepentant statement,
Kennedy, Legal education and the reproduction of hierarchy: a polemic against
the system: a critical edition (2004).
4
~ See Fuller's discussion on participation in "Freedom as a Problem of Allocating
Choice" (1968) 112 Proc. Am.Phil.Ass. 103. In the second edition of his
collection of Fuller's essays, Kenneth Winston offers a new interpretation of the
role of the concept of freedoms in Fuller's thinking; see Winston, "Introduction to
the revised edition", p.l, The Principles ofSocial Order (2001).
47 This includes not only the genesis of the norm but also the process by which one
norm comes to take precedence over others. However, the same caution should be
taken in approaching this "sorting" stage so as not to fall into the same
prescriptivist mode as the "source" inquiry does. The prioritization of competing
norms (all of which derive from interaction) is also a process over which each
agent has control: to dedicate the sorting realm to pre-established processes (such
as voting, legislation, war, etc.) would succumb to the same structuralist
conception that a preoccupation with source adopts.
48 Some observers see this binary characteristic as the dominant "code of law". The
autopoietic thesis is illustrative. Set: most recently, Patterson and Teubner,
"Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis'', p.215, in Banaker and Travers
(eds.), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (2005). But note that the
model presumed is the criminal law - the easy referent for those who are
pessimistic about people, and deterministic in their conception of human
capacities.
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nonnative choices of everyday life and, therefore, as moments of selfdiscovery, people under the prescriptivist illusion avoid engaging the
normative question altogether. 49 The overwhelming majority of their
experiences - their co-coordinating moments of quotidian social intercourse,
their affective relationships, their emotions and shared aesthetic engagements
- become simply extra-legal. In self-legislating this discontinuity, people
then need sloganistic assurances such as "the state has no place in the
bedroom of the nation", or meta-normative symbols like Charters of Rights
to memorialize the subliminal understanding that their most intimate
moments of self-discovery and understanding are necessarily separate from,
and must be protected against incursions by, the "legitimated" centre of
official decision-making in society.so
Despite the rhetoric, however, most people have an instinctive sense that the
official rules aren't really the primary referent in their normative lives.s 1 That
is, intuitively they take an anti-prescriptivist position; they understand
official prescriptions as the currently (but ultimately contingently) favoured
representations of interactions just like those in issue. Whenever they
wilfully break a rule (by, for example, jaywalking or using a cell phone in a
library), or when they accept a penalty in order to enjoy the convenience of
their transgression (for example, parking deliberately in a restricted zone, or
smoking), or when they consciously refuse to exercise some right or facility
ostensibly provided by official law (such as declining to formalize an
affective relationship as a marriage, or to enforce a contractual remedy) they
are rejecting the claim to nonnative monopoly on the field of interaction to
which those official rules presumptively speak.
By accepting that manifest rules (especially the manifest rules of the state
legal order) do not have a monopoly over their normative universe - a
nomopoly - people compel themselves to confront these source rules reactively with the same care that the attention to the foundational interaction
(the pre-action) at the genesis of the rule requires. Prescriptions become yet
another text or ''text-analogue"s2 susceptible to an open-ended and selfrelevant interpretation. The pedagogy is reciprocal. Thus the "norm" that
engages everyday practices of crossing a street is informed simultaneously
by by-laws prohibiting jaywalking, the physical street, the common response
of the pedestrian/driver/police officer, the uncommon responses of these
actors, the court system, statutes and principles of civil liability, the time of
day, the time of year, the weather, and so on. As such, the "norm" is best

49

Admittedly, we make consciously re-active "normative choices" much more often
when we contemplate "official" law, especially when this state-sanctioned rule is a
proscription. But, under the prescriptivist hypothesis, the legal subject is deprived
not only of the learning opportunity that attends these relatively rare moments of
conscious resistance, he or she is blinded to the infinite other learning moments
that attend the contemplation ofnormativity in the everyday.
so The point is carefully developed in Jutras, "The Legal Dimensions of Everyday
Life" (2001) 16 Can.J.L. & Soc y 45.
si For an extended discussion of this point see Macdonald, "Measure", supra n.25,
and "Triangulating" supra n.21.
s2 The thought derives from Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of Man", p. I 0 I,
in Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy (eds.), Understanding and Social
Inquiry, (1977).
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apprehended as a set of ongoing interactions among diverse phenomena, only
some of which are under the control of human agents. It is constantly
susceptible to change according to the way in which individual agents
prioritize these phenomena.
In releasing himself or herself to the pedagogic role of official prescriptions,
the agent facilitates a reciprocal transformation. Thereafter, these
prescriptions are conceived as inviting a non-binary range of re-actions - and
an open set of questions - whose terms are authored by the agent under the
same range of considerations as that agent's pre-active practices. The
ongoing interaction of legal· agents with the edict reconstructs its meaning;
and the act of interpretation enables these agents to reconstruct themselves. 53
The emancipatory potential of anti-prescriptivism (especially as directed at
representations of the official state legal order) is not, however, self evident
to many. At least four substantive critiques might be suggested. We label
them the statist critique, the realist critique, the social justice critique and the
·
false consensus critique.
Take first the statist critique. Doesn't the fact that most people follow the
explicit and institutionalized prescriptions of the political state mean that the
claim for agency and choice is illusory? Doesn't this mean that, whatever
the theory, law dictates behaviour? To answer the statist critique it is
necessary to think through the several possible relationships that can arise
between human action and the representations of official law. What
becomes apparent in pursuing such an endeavour is that the positivist
understanding of conforming social fact being confirmatory of a statist
nomopoly rests on the unproven assumption that people follow the state
rather than the state following people.
Moreover, the .nomopolistic
hypothesis confuses cause and correlation. Alternate explanations for
behaviour apparently in conformity with state-prescribed rules abound. 54
Sometimes people act in a particular way without awareness that a specific
rule of law requires, counsels, permits or even advantages the behaviour in
question. Sometimes people are aware of the norm of state law, but act as
they do for their own reasons having little or nothing to do with that norm.
Sometimes people act in the manner required by the state norm out of
convenience, because doing so is of no great consequence to them.
Sometimes people consciously elect to act as a rule prescribes because they
consider the rule to be just and appropriate in the circumstances. Finally,

53

This point is explored with much subtlety in Kasirer, "Honour Bound" (2001) 47

54

In the three paragraphs that follow a variety of hypotheses about human action are
presented. These hypotheses are not meant as empirical claims. Rather they are
offered as an inventoiy of categories that cover actions where people are both
aware of and, especially, not aware of, a legal rule purportedly governing those
actions. Admittedly, there is a rich empirical literature exploring why people do
or do not obey the law. See, for a leading example, Tyler, Why People Obey the
Law (1990). Nonetheless, the Tyler monograph and similar studies focus on
asking people (after the fact) why they choose to obey a legislative prescription, or
more commonly, a court decision that they know about, thereby finessing the veiy
question posed here: can one automatically extrapolate from factually conforming
behaviour to the conclusion that the behaviour is caused by a legal rule?

McGill L.J. 237.
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sometimes people choose to follow a rule that they genuinely believe unjust,
because of the larger claim that it is just to obey the rules of the state that aim
at justice (even when they fail, in individual cases, to do so). Only in the last
of these cases can it be said that there is a significant prescriptive weight
attaching to the normative order of the state.
Human action not in conformity with the prescriptions of state Jaw is equally
diverse in its motivations. Sometimes people act contrary to a rule of state
law because they are ignorant of it. Sometimes, as in much regulatory law,
people do so unreflectively and carelessly. Sometimes contrary action is
grounded simply in opportunistic and self-interested reasons. Sometimes
people accept the justice of the rule as a general proposition, but not of its
application in the particular case they are confronting. Sometimes people act
in opposition to a legal rule of the state not because they imagine the rule to
be unjust, but simply because it is contrary to some other rule, of some other
legal order that they considered primary in the circumstances. Sometimes,
the state rule may be irrelevant to the way in which they order their lives.
Finally, sometimes their dissenting behaviour is based on their belief that the
rule is unjust. This. dissent finds different modes of expression depending on
the type of Jaw in question: so, for example, refusing to acknowledge a
prohibition of the criminal law thought to be unjust is not the same as
refusing to make a will because one believes that inter-generational wealth
transfers upon death are unjust.
The legal rules of the State, then, do not necessarily operate to enjoin specific
behaviour in cases when that behaviour is consistent with those rules.
Moreover, even when people are aware of an official legal rule, their
conforming behaviour may have more to do with indifference, prudential
considerations or adherence to an identical standard arising in religion on
personal morality than with deep commitment to official law. When they
are known, the rules emanating from the State legal order function in many
cases as institutional short-cuts that enable people to discern what action has
been collectively imagined to be appropriate in what circumstances. 55 They
are not, however,, the final word on these matters. Short of brainwashing
and other coercive manoeuvres aimed at consciousness rather than action, the
individual conscience can neither be coerced nor dictated to by any external
rule of just conduct. There is always a moment of judgement, of
interpretation, of decision. Any rules elaborated by and through official
institutions and processes, just like rules of appropriate conduct flowing from
social conventions or the representations of social institutions, must always
be seen as no more than hypotheses about, or approximations of, justice. All
obedience to law is, in this light, the fruit of personal reflection - greater or
lesser, conscious or tacit, according to the case - and a judgement about what
justice requires. 56

55

56

We have consciously used the .word "appropriate" to embrace a variety of
possibilities: sometimes collective wisdom is grounded in appeals to justice;
sometimes to expediency or a simple coordinating function; sometimes to
economic efficiency. What matters is less the specific justification for the
collective imagination than it is the fact of the. collective imagination being
engaged in elaborating a legal rule.
While the example responds directly to the statist critique, it also addresses
prescriptivism in any other nonnative site - from the Catholic Church, to the

;I
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The realist or "power" critique is as follows: what good is it to be awakened
to one's constitutive capabilities as a legal agent if one is at the mercy of a
normative system (typically that of the state, but potentially that of a teenage
gang, or the local imam, priest or rabbi, the union or one's employer, one's
neighbours or family, or one's favourite television show) that is able to
impose its own interpretations backed by coercion (whether psychological or
physical)? The implied point is that power and violence are all around us
and only the state - itself an agent of power and violence - can do anything
about it. Without the state, the argument goes, life is "solitary, poore, nastie,
brutish and shorte".
Cover may be interpreted this way - as prioritizing the judge's responsibility
to be attentive to various nomoi of diverse constitutive communities over the
normative agency of the everyday association. 57 Of course, Cover may also
be read as arguing for this type of osmotic decision-making in all sites,
including those of everyday association; but the language he uses and the
examples he gives suggest a perception that non-state communities have an
integrity, coherence and monistic character (an internal nomopoly), and that
only the state confronts normative pluralism. Moreover, the institutional
focus of Cover's injunction suggests that while all of us may have
interpretive freedom and power, it is most important to awaken the
imagination (and stoke the resolve) of judges. To frame such an institutional
ambition is to have already internalized the prescriptivist ontology - the
belief that there is some (often unnameable) power external to ourselves
under which we are subjects. 58 It suggests that the most important normative
moment is that relatively rare one when physical violence is visited upon us
by some sanctioned authority. 59
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workplace, to the sports field, to the Hell's Angels, to the workings of an
international NGO. One should not, that is, imagine that the continuity of preactive normative interaction and re-active interpretive engagement with diverse
representations of rules exists only where the legal order of the state is in view.
On this specific point see Macdonald, "Legal Republicanism and Legal Pluralism:
Two Takes on Identity and Diversity", pp.43-70, in Bussani and Graziadei (eds.),
Human Diversity and the Law (2005) [Hereinafter Macdonald, "Legal
Republicanism"].
Cover, supra n.10, at 66: "In our own complex nomos, however, it is the manifoid,
equally dignified communal bases of legal meaning that constitute the array of
commitments, realities and visions extant at any given time. The judge must
resolve the competing claims of the redemptive constitutionalism of an excluded
race, on the one hand, and of insularity, the protection of association, on the other"
(emphasis added).
·
Parallels can be made with the "Position Two" of Margaret Atwood's "Basic
Victim Positions" in Survival (1972). At p.37 she describes "Position Two" in the
following terms: "To acknowledge the fact that you are a victim, but to explain
this as an act of Fate, the Will of God, the dictates of Biology ... , the necessity
decreed by History, or Economics, or the Unconscious, or any other large general
powerful idea".
·
·
One can imagine countless examples in which the violence inflicted by authorities
should eclipse all other considerations. But these instances should be considered
to be exceptions, and not standard-prescribing limiting cases. To hold that one's
position with respect to rules is a matter of choice only up until some threshold of
violence is reached would confine agency too narrowly. The agent's approach to
normativity should begin from the premise that it is almost always possible to be a
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A response requires reorienting the terms from the material to the
aspirational and imaginative. Because. the interpretation is never-ending,
anti-prescriptivism is a perpetually open project. It is aspirational in the
same way that paradigmatic inquiries are. In order to re-order the world, we
must first re-imagine it. We must re-imagine ourselves as sovereign.60
On a more pragmatic note, this reorients the role of judges, legislators and
others vested with formal authority for our legal apparatus. By
acknowledging that the sanctioned translations are only representational
hypotheses, people who are preoccupied with governance would be less
concerned about internal consistency, more tolerant of contradiction, and
more open to pluralist approaches to legislation and adjudication.61 Such
pluralism would free judges and legislators from the impossible task of
writing, interpreting and enforcing The Law, and instead conceive of them
only as privileged - but not authoritative - spokespersons of a normative
universe that is, at its root, heterogeneous. 62
This response does not, however, fully meet the realist critique. The issue of
power is not just about changes (or the absence of changes) to the fields of
the legal, but to the directions and forms that change takes. Hegemonic
power succeeds precisely, if paradoxically, because it is incomplete, always
inviting the participation and cooperation of the subject.63 Hegeq10nic power
creates ostensibly participatory spaces not just for participation and
engagement within its structures, but also for active resistance. By co-opting
and nonnalizing such engagement, the argument goes, the hegemonic order
pre-empts external, system-wide critique and resistance.
In the first place, if one adopts an anti-prescriptivist epistemology there can
be no definitive, complete, and unique hegemonic legal order. In their
everyday activity, all legal actors - citizens, legal theorists, officials, indeed
anyone involved with law - are at once contesting and legitimating all
possible legal normativities. The emancipatory potential of this approach is
achieved through its denial that the state has a monopoly over the law, either
institutionally or symbolically. One must examine not only how the legal
orders of the state (today's hegemon) view non-state legal orders, but how
non-state legal orders view the state legal order. The legal order of the state
is constituted as much by the recognition of non-state orders as these orders
are constituted by the recognition afforded by the state; and the

60

61

62

63

"creative non-victim" in response to prescriptions (Atwood, ibid., at 38-41 ). For
an illustration of the imaginative potential in the face of oppression, see Roberto
Benigni's film Life is Beautiful.
Of course, "sovereign" is a metaphor. We are clearly not sovereign with respect to
the material conditions that precede our birth. But the point. is that one's horizons
are limited by one's position at a point in time, and that the possibility of
movement and change implies a freedom to discover new freedoms.
For a ·discussion of the connection between plurality and dissonance in
normativity, see Macdonald, "Les vieilles gardes", supra n.16, at 267-269; and
Macdonald, "Fridge-door Statute", supra n.38.
A meditation on the necessary humility of official actors such as judges may be
found in van Praagh, "Identity's Importance: Reflections of - and on - Diversity"
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 605, at 617--619.
The point is derived from Gramsd, Prison.Notebooks (1971).
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representations of both are simply hypotheses to be interpreted by those who
choose to afford them recognition. 64
More importantly, to recognize the plurality of normative communities does
not presuppose that these communities are of equal weight or wort?. No
legitimacy is conferred by the sole fact of ackno~le.dgment. .Takmg. the
prescriptivist approach, one might see the charactensation of social relations
as legal as conferring a gift - a power to prescribe - and therefore would
wish to withhold the title wherever injustice reigns. The anti-prescriptivist
inverts both the benefit and the burden: naming phenomena as normative
imposes a substantive demand of justice upon them, for law "demands a
responsibility".65 The light cast onto human interaction under the hypothesis
of law opens to contestation claims of authority, exposes misuses of
legitimating instruments by those who claim power, and in doing so
eliminates the shadows of neutrality and false necessity in which injustice
cou!d otherwise hide. 66
This thought leads to consideration of the social justice critique. Antiprescriptivism might be seen as a veil for conservatism - for justifying
existing distributions of social power and wealth - thereby substituting the
67
need to reform prescriptions with a practice for explaining them.
This
evocation of legitimacy, authority, equality and identity points to some
possible objections to the anti-prescriptivist perspective. Might it simply be
just another formulaic accommodation of the status quo, and denial of the
pathologies of power, and another reproduction of the cultural hegemony of
established privilege?
This is also a significant objection for what it tells us about prescriptivist
assumptions. To be sure, antiprescriptivism does not operate on a premise
that relationships are unequal. It does not rest on an a priori critique of
distributional differentials, but the attention to human interaction and
especially our own practices can make us more attuned to injustice. If a
prescription seems unfair, we are forced to interrogate our actions to fuid the
source of the unfairness. By focusing on. our own, specific pattern of
interaction we can identify injustice more easily. Once the injustice is
discovered, our attention to interaction positions us to re-iterate our practices
and reform them. An anti-prescriptivist approach would contest pre-existing
frontiers of knowledge - including the frontier between legal knowledge and
social knowledge - and would lay bare the interpretive practices by which
choices about knowledge categories are made. That is, by seeing diverse
ways in which practices, interaction and community identification mutually
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construct each other as legal representations, our access to law as social
artefact increases. Our capacity to transform social relations also increases,
as we are called on to ·reform our behaviour as a precondition for the
effective re-writing of manifest rules. 68
All three of these critiques - statist, realist, social justice - are incomplete
because they ignore what is perhaps the most profound point of antiprescriptivism: that effect or result is not the only standard by which to
eval_uate normativity. The symbolic aspect ofnormativity, the message that a
part1~ular means of conceiving of rules gives to citizens, is as important as
any mstrumental measure. Adopting an anti-prescriptivism stance empowers
us to decide between the instrumental and the symbolic function of law. We
not only constitute and choose among rules, we determine how we will
consider the role of rules: do they constrict? empower? facilitate? do they
teach? entertain? inspire?
Law- however variegated, diverse, complex, organic - is not only a machine
for social production, it is a locale for discussion and discovery. At the very
least, anti-prescriptivism demands that we consider this possibility. To say
that considering interaction as foundational produces a conservative,
impotent or misplaced result ignores the idea that the value of symbolizing
law lies not just in the zone between facilitation ofhuman activity and social
contr~l _over i~. It_ also always !ies, if we take up the opportunity, in its
r~flex1~1ty: L1~e hterat~re, music, art. and science, the legal enterprise at
times invites mtrospect1on and leammg. It effaces the discontinuities
between the multiple locations of our normative commitments.
Accordingly, labels such as hortatory or descriptive do not adequately
capture the legal pluralist project. Anti-prescriptivism involves extricating
oneself from the sole goal of accounting for, or urging an account of the
no~ative practices of a community. The means by which a comm~ity
decides among rules - the diverse, sometimes conflicting propositions that
interaction creates - are as individual as the rules themselves. Of course, this
affirm~tio~ invites what might be called the false consensus critique, namely,
the object10n that the anti-prescriptivist conception of "law as interaction"
rests on an "artificial commonality". 69 That is, an important critique of social
scientific legal pluralism is its propensity to imagine that the legal norms in
qu~stion flow directly and unproblematically from interaction - that they are
neither contested, nor constructed by, interpretation flowing from
·
interaction. 70
I
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It is important to signal that this is not a libertarian claim for anarchy - for the
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unlimited power of agency to trump social and economic power. Nor is it a claim
that people's conceptions of themselves as agents can exist independently of the
social structures within which they are embedded. The real power of agency lies
in the awareness of its contingency and limitations. See, in particular, Kleinhans
and Macdonald, supra n.1, at 25; Melissaris, supra n.18.
We owe this framing of the point to Desmond Manderson who develops the
argument in Proximity, Levinas and the Soul ofLaw (2006).
See Macdonald, "Metaphors of Multiplicity", supra n. l.
For a discussion on how a constitutive conception of law is not tantamount to a cooptation by hegemony, see Macdonald, "Here, There and Everywhere", supra n.1;
and, with MacLean, "No Toilets in Park" (2006) 50 McGill L.J. 721.
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To repeat, this does not mean that the representational normativity of cultural
practices is more fu_ndamental, or more important than that of the state. The
antiprescriptivist take on legal pluralism presumes an epistemologieal equivalence
- every representational claim from whatever legal regime is grounded in
foundational interaction - but does not presume a necessary and ex ante ranking of
these regimes external to the legal agent.
See the discussion in Webber, supra n. I.
The folly of this critique, ironically, lies in its prescriptivist commitments. It rests
on th~ idea that "law comes out of self', whereby each person is an atomistic,
prescriptivist law giver. Antiprescriptivism attacks this premise, opposing the
model of the normative agent who engages in an interactive conversation with
norms themselves born of manifold prior interactions.
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The objection, however accurate as a typecasting of certai~ ~o1?11s of _!~gal
pluralism, folds in on itself once one take~ an ant1-prescnptiv1st pos1t1on.
For the objection depends on an assumption ~at there. can only ~e o~e
common authoritative mode of interpretation (findmg meanmg m
interaction) and legitimation (choosing among competing rules) ~nan}'. given
normative site. Anti-prescriptivism proposes that even the dissentmg or
subordinated interpretation may "rule." To determine whether it does so ~le
would be an entirely empirical inquiry - possible, but of only partial
significance. It is the possibility that the agent need not succumb to a
communal mode of legitimation - that she ~s n~t bound ~y an exte~a!IY
imposed prioritization (such as the translation mto mamfest normatlVl_ty
known as legislation) that creates the distinctive power of the plurahst
project. What is more, the confusion, incoherenc~ and indete~inacy (the
absence of commonality) are as much a part of official representations of law
as they are the normative representations of manifold unofficial sites of
human interaction. 71

IV. Ago and Patior in Legal Pluralism
Anti-prescriptivism, like prescriptivism, is not a truth claim. It is a ""'.ay of
characterizing an interpretive choice for citizens about how they wish t?
conceive law themselves and the relationship they have to law. The ant1prescriptivist 'perspective invites legal subjects to imagine themselves as
legal agents - to discover the constihitive potential of their own actions.. In
so doing, their instrumental sufferance (patior) of legal rules deme~~g
them as legal subjects is replaced by the endeavour (ago) of symbohzmg
human interaction as governed by rules.
The practice of anti-prescriptivism is, consequently, foundation-building.
We teach ourselves to examine our own interactions, and to learn about law,
first and foremost, from ourselves. 72 Situating the project of normativity
within the universe of learning also enables us to view prescriptions for their
pedagogic value - and so pursue our self-discovery in tandem with our selfexplorations about what is just. To reject the prescription as the source and
force of law requires us to appreciate our own norm-constituting potential, to
accept that interaction is fundamental to all_ n~rmativity .- ~o~ever
formalized, however explicit. Even that externahzat1on of our nnphc1t and
inferential knowledge that we might call latent normativity is not selfgenerated. It arises in interaction with others.
While the anti-prescriptivist claim coheres with the general tenor of nonessentialist legal pluralism, 73 it does not, inevitably, drive one to legal
pluralism. Those who assume the conflation of law and state - legal
centralists - have much to gain from an anti-prescriptivist inquiry. Recasting the most formulaic and explicit representations of legal prescriptions
as opportunities for self-learning and reconstitution is good ti:aining for
applying interrogative muscle to the more intimate aspects of our hves. Even
the positivist animus (the binary attempt to find law) can help focus our
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In this, the claim recalls the flux of reactions to official Jaw in the novel by Garcia
Marquez, News ofa Kidnapping(l997).
See Macdonald, "Everyday Law", supra n.25, "Introduction".
For further development of this point see Melissaris, supra n.18.
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introspection by reminding us that we have a choice to symbolize our
interactions as speaking about normativity.
Each of monism, centralism and positivism reflects a different preoccupation
with delineating the legal from the non-legal - either spatially (centralism),
numerically (monism), or analytically (positivism).
Prescriptivism is
animated by the same ambition: it asserts that there are rules, and that there
is the rest of the world on which they operate. Each of these four
commitments is plagued by a commitment to nomopolies. While they may
differ as to what sphere constitutes the nomopoly, one thing is consistent:
the human agent is outside that sphere.
Prescriptivism makes possible the term "legal subject", a term that sharply
divides the legal from what is thrown under the legal. It is this tacit ontology
of otherness that the anti-prescriptivist perspective puts into play.
Overcoming prescriptivism in legal theory ·is, we believe, the key to
achieving a non-superficial legal pluralism. So long as the source of one's
understanding of living in the world rests on an implicit separation between
us and our world, all expressions of normative diversity are unhappy
translations of the same dichotomous worldview that afflicts non-pluralist
hypotheses. 74
In turning our attention to unspoken understandings of how human beings
interact with diverse representations of legal norms, we may discover that the
commitments we hold - or tell ourselves we hold - are imperfect translations
of a self we do not know, or want to know. We may learn something
unpleasant about how we perceive human agency and surprise ourselves by
our implicit psychology of subservience;75 but such are the risks of declining
the invitation to be simply a legal subject.

74
75

On this point see Macdonald, "Legal Republicanism", supra n.51, at 43.
A similar self-revelation is nicely exposed in the well-known exchange between
Richard Posner and Robin West. See West, "Authority, Autonomy and Choice:
the role of consent in the moral and political vision of Franz Kafka and Richard
Posner" (1985) 99 Harv.L.Rev. 384; Posner, "The Ethical Significance of Free
Choice: A Reply to Professor West" (1986) 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1449; West,
"Submission, . Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner" (1986) 99
Harv.L.Rev. 1449. The last paragraph of the third article puts this issue squarely.
We often take so-called "theoretical" positions for very "untheoretical" reasons notably because we fear what we may learn about our5elves: our submissiveness,
our flight from responsibility, and our refusal to recognize the harm our worldview creates, makes possible, or legitimates.
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